Reflections from a Six-Day War Hero: "We Witnessed Heavenly Aid"

"We understood that these were moments destined for the history books," recounts Shaike Gavish, the Southern Command leader during the Six-Day War and the strategy mastermind against the Egyptian front. Within just three days, Gavish led the IDF to the banks of the Suez Canal. Reflecting on the chaotic pre-war days, the miraculous victory, and the gratitude that followed, Gavish shares his story.

He's now the last of the command echelon from that era. Known as the last survivor of the Six-Day War fighters, his leadership under Allied skies led to a victory that stunned the world, especially when it seemed the Jewish state might fall to Egyptian forces whose boots, ultimately, were left behind like discarded refuse as they fled across the canal.

"I vividly remember the command I issued on radio July 5, 1967, at 08:15. It was brief: 'Red Sheet,' and it signaled the IDF forces to strike the Egyptians encamped in Sinai. The day's orders to commanders underscored this event's historic importance, a momentous call for the Jewish people. I wrote to the soldiers: 'Today you face the most significant mission of our lives - defending our nation... Commanders, soldiers, let us go into battle and triumph... May Hashem be with you," said Shaike Gavish, reflecting as the Southern Command Leader.

As they say, the rest is history.

One Against Three

"I knew we had to go to war from the start," Gavish asserts, referring to the taxing days of waiting. "Nasser amassed vast forces on the opposite bank of the Suez Canal and ordered UN forces to leave the area, which signaled his ultimate plans." Despite the Israeli command's push for immediate action to surprise Egypt, the government held back, seeking diplomatic avenues. "What kept us in check was the government trying to prevent Nasser's ambitions through diplomacy," he explained.

How did you handle waiting?

"It was tough for the combatants and command. We continued prepping for war opposite a formidable force in Sinai. I remember establishing a deception unit to influence the ongoing battle plans, even without government consent. At night, we painted silhouettes of tanks and artillery on boards, perched them on light military vehicles and by morning, they appeared heavy and threatening, creating the mirage of a large army. When media photographers spread images of the phony force advancing, gamers and observers swallowed the bait, making Nasser deploy more than a hundred tanks and twenty percent of their forces based on our deceptive visuals. Only after the war did Egyptians realize the supposed threat was a mere illusion."

Besides deception, you likely made thorough preparations.

"Indeed," he affirms. "I composed a battle plan focusing on a showdown in northern Sinai and frontal axing and encircling Egyptian forces, using Soviet-style strategies executed against Nazi Germany. Studying immense battles where the Soviet encirclements starved and overwhelmed German divisions, I adopted similar tactics to besiege Egyptian forces and cut off their access to the canal."

What's the situation from your perspective during the preparations?

"The Egyptians outnumbered us massively. Leading the southern front, I commanded most IDF forces at the time: three divisions," he notes humorously. The IDF's assets, except one reserve division kept in Tel Aviv, were thinly spread.

"Pure data," he said somberly, "Nasser deployed seven divisions and a thousand tanks, alongside an air force and artillery," outlining the daunting odds against Israel. "I had around 400 tanks. They had over double our resources. After Nasser said, 'if Rabin wants war, let it be,' our aim was simple: destroy as much of the Egyptian army as possible. But accomplishing this was far from simple. Egyptian strength and their threat to hurl Jews into the sea resurrected fears of another Holocaust. It was a genuine existential threat, creating severe anxiety. Even our command had serious doubts, given this was our worst force disparity ever. At the time, Egypt operated with the most modern tanks and planes."

The grim facts were shared with Prime Minister Levi Eshkol during a visit to the front. "He queried me on the force we observed over a southern hill. I informed him hundred tanks and artillery were present. He asked, 'How many are opposite us in soldiers?' 7,000, I answered. Surprised, Eshkol wondered about their advantage. I argued that weapon quality outweighed soldier numbers. The true threat is their military machinery," I emphasized. We were 30,000 soldiers against 130,000 Egyptians, but the key is in the strength of the armor and artillery."

Victory and Survival

Since those times, Israel faced another significant war, the Yom Kippur War. Gavish views that conflict as one he wished to avoid. "Our question back then was how to defeat a much larger army and survive. In the Yom Kippur War, though victorious, we suffered 3,000 casualties. It was a painful victory. During the Six-Day War, only 300 soldiers fell in the southern front."

What were your casualty estimates?

"Certainly not 300," he asserts. "We anticipated thousands, soldiers and civilians. When Moshe Dayan visited headquarters days before the war erupted, estimations were grim. Dayan, not in an official role then, reviewed our plans and declared we would prevail, predicting twenty thousand soldiers would die, and doubted we'd reach the canal," remembers Gavish.

For those who recall, such was also public sentiment. Thousands of graves were prepared in anticipation of mass casualties that, through great divine mercy, did not occur.

With such problematic data, why did the government not approve striking first?

"The government feared war immensely, and rightly so. They were the many, and we were the few. Also, Israel's global allies urged avoiding preemptive action, including figures like Ben-Gurion, who, though officially retired, still influenced public opinion against war."

Ben-Gurion's resolve against a first strike led to a direct confrontation with Gavish. "He pounded the table and shouted: 'Who authorized you to risk Israel with unnecessary wars?' I said, 'My family lives here. Do you know how quickly an Egyptian tank can reach Be'er Sheva? Two hours, no obstacles in their way. We can’t wait for negotiations or their first move.' Ben-Gurion challenged, acknowledging the great responsibility, and left unconvinced. After a week, once I was along the canal, I called Ben-Gurion, offering a helicopter flight to show him the war results. He visited, acknowledged our achievement, but never admitted his error.

"We calculated," Gavish recounts, "that the Suez troop surge came after the Syrians sought Egyptian intervention. Realizing they couldn’t confront Israel solo over water diversion issues at the Jordan, the Syrians appealed for Egyptian arms. Nasser accepted also to withdraw from a bloody African stalemate and champion Arab confrontation against Israel, aiming for what no one had achieved: Israel's demise."

"Red Sheet"

The days unfolding pre-war saw Israel rocked by events, the national spirit shifting like a weather vane. A significant public confidence dip arose from Levi Eshkol's hesitated pre-war speech, as an unfinished script sparked nerves. Public pressure surged, leading to Moshe Dayan's reinstatement at a pivotal military role, seen widely as a strategic genius. The government conceded, initially offering Dayan southern command, where they believed victory lay. Only at the final moment, Dayan accepted the Defense Minister role offered previously, leaving Gavish to handle major war theater.

"For years afterwards, Rabin – who commanded my intended dismissal until Dayan reversed course – couldn't meet my gaze. I was angry at Rabin for his compliance. He was pressured, but should have resisted, even risked his resignation." Despite this, Gavish heaps praise on the wartime Chief of Staff and future Prime Minister. "Although he wasn’t born a leader, he was extremely intelligent, a true genius."

Any inner battles in high command faded as war approached.

How did you craft your war strategy?

"Our battle vision leveraged the air force eradicating Middle Eastern air forces and my envelop tactic encircling Egyptians in Sinai. Our forecasted synergy of air and ground forces could drastically shift odds against the Egyptians," Gavish explains.

On the eve of conflict, disputes erupted between the ground and air forces. Air Force generals requested Gavish delay ground assault by hours post-air strike. "Air Force head, Moti Hod, proposed a long gap from air strike at 7 a.m. to our ground attack at 12 noon. I objected, needing surprise too, settling on a half-hour delay post-air assault."

Gavish adds, "Starting the attack at 7 a.m., rather than at night as per Israeli norm for surprise, arose from intel that Egyptian pilots dined from 7-8 a.m., choosing to catch them at breakfast."

As the chosen day dawned, command alertness rose. Gavish reached kerem Shalom on a military vehicle, joined by comrades. "At 7 a.m. sharp, we observed Air Force jets overhead en route to Egypt, excitement and readiness in the air," he recalls. Exactly thirty minutes later, at 07:30 a.m., he issued the command: "Red Sheet," commencing the ground war with countless soldiers surprising Egyptian forces.

Israel's three divisions launched an all-out assault on Egyptian lines as drafted by Gavish. "We attacked central Sinai to El-Arish using all three divisions, normally holding one in reserve, but facing major numerical inferiority, we couldn't hold back reserves, trusting in Hashem for battle."

Amazingly and with divine grace, Gavish’s set strategy unfolded as per plan. After four intense days, his forces reached the Suez's banks, with the Egyptian military trapped within. "With an encircling division south, north, and central, the Egyptian army was wedged between." Despite unimaginable scenarios of the war's onset globally, Gavish knew the southern fight owed immense success to divine guidance. "We saw divine aid on every turn" he admits.