Is it permitted for a woman to wear a bathing suit at a separate beach?

Greetings,

It is forbidden for a woman to go in a bathing suit at a beach where there is a male lifeguard, because this causes him to stumble. Rather, she must wear a robe so that the covered places will not be seen.

Sources: This was also ruled by Rav Ovadia Yosef zt"l in the monthly Ohr Torah (Elul 5746, siman 131, seif 16), and it was brought in the book Shulchan Yosef (page 270). It was likewise ruled in Shu"t Mikor Neeman part 1 (siman 287), part 2 (siman 533), in Shu"t Vaya an David part 2 (siman 184), in Shu"t Or Yitzchak part 2 (various matters, simanim 9-10), in Shu"t Birit Shalom part 1 (siman 14), in Shu"t Asher Chanan part 6 (siman 90), part 8 (siman 168), in the book Beit Yechezkel part 1 (pages 40-41), in the book Um Ani Choma part 1 (page 112), in the book Otzar Dinim laIsha ulaBat (chapter 60, seif 34), and in the book Hilkhot Bat Yisrael (chapter 7, seif 18).

As for those who argue that it should be permitted because the lifeguard is occupied with his work, and they wished to compare this to what is written in Tractate Avodah Zarah (daf 20b) that a launderer may wash a woman's colorful garments even though he knows her, and we are not concerned that he will come to improper thoughts, because he is occupied with his work. See there. In truth, there is nothing to this claim, and there is a great distance between the leniency stated regarding a launderer and our case, for several reasons:

A. The entire leniency was stated regarding a launderer, who is performing actual labor, unlike one who merely looks; could it enter the mind that he is not turning his attention to something else?! And do we not see with our own eyes that many lifeguards, while working, engage in phone conversations and the like, and certainly their minds are likewise available to feast their eyes on forbidden sight (and see also in Shu"t Vaya an David there, section 3, in Shu"t Asher Chanan part 8 there, and in Shu"t Birit Shalom there, s.v. gam).

B. It is simply the case that there the discussion is of a launderer who is observant and seeks to guard himself from sinful thoughts, and for that reason his work and preoccupation help him. But with a promiscuous person who seeks as much as possible to have improper thoughts and to feast his eyes on forbidden sight, it is obvious that this does not apply (and this distinction was also written in Shu"t Vaya an David there, and in Shu"t Birit Shalom, s.v. uveemet shegam).

C. Only regarding a clothes launderer did they permit on the basis of the reasoning of being occupied with his work, because the prohibition there applies only when one intentionally seeks enjoyment from the beauty of the garments. This is not so with the covered places of a woman, which are forbidden even by a mere glance without intent for enjoyment, as the Mishnah Berurah wrote (siman 75, subparagraph 7). Therefore the reasoning of being occupied with his work does not apply. Consequently, by this reasoning too, it should be forbidden even with a lifeguard who is observant (Shu"t Birit Shalom there, s.v. uveemet nireh li. See also Shu"t Asher Chanan part 8 there).

Indeed, some wished to infer from the words of Igrot Moshe, Even HaEzer part 4 (siman 62, section 1), that it is permitted for a woman to swim in a place where there is a male lifeguard. See there. However, there are two answers to this -

In Shu"t Birit Shalom (there), it was written that Igrot Moshe is speaking of a non-Jewish lifeguard (as is common in America), who has no prohibition at all with regard to guarding his eyes, and there he discussed only the prohibition of seclusion of one man with many women, and regarding that he said it is permitted because he is occupied with his work and will not be able to tempt her to be with him at the time when he is obligated to guard and rescue.

The Birit Shalom also wrote there that even if Igrot Moshe had explicitly written that his intent was to permit even a Jewish lifeguard, still he gave no reason at all for his words regarding the lifeguard's guarding of the eyes (but only regarding the prohibition of seclusion), whereas the authorities who wrote to prohibit gave reasons for their words. And it is explained in Rashi in Ketubot (daf 100a, s.v. lima) that where one gives a reason for his words and another argues without giving a reason for his words, the halacha follows the one who gives a reason for his words; moreover, one who rules like the other one, who did not give a reason for his words, is considered as one who errs in a mishnah. This was cited as halacha by Rav Shlomo Kluger in his book Mishpat Tzedek, Choshen Mishpat (siman 25).

With blessings,

Hillel Meirs